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Colonizing the demos? Settler rights, Indigenous sovereignty,
and the contested ‘structure of governance’ in Canada’s North
Aaron John Spitzer
Institute of Comparative Politics, University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway
ABSTRACT
Settler-colonialism can consist of a struggle over the pre-political
‘structure of governance’ – over who composes the demos and how
decisions should be made. This article examines two lawsuits where
settlers contested the Indigenous structure of governance in Canada’s
Northwest Territories. I show that in both cases settlers brandished a
novel ‘tool of elimination,’ individual rights to voting, mobility and
expression. I trace how settlers used this tool in a strategic two-
pronged way, challenging as ‘illiberal’ restrictive laws flowing from
Indigenous sovereignty and then championing race-neutral laws the
promulgation of which would open the demos to settler domination.
I show that courts adjudicating these challenges were compelled to
grapple with the appropriate ‘framing of justice’ – with whether
the relevant rights-bearer was the universal individual or the
‘constitutionally prior’ Indigenous demos. I conclude that, where
the court decided on individual-rights grounds, settlers were able







The March 1958 edition ofMADmagazine featured a comic depicting the Lone Ranger and
Tonto surrounded by apparently hostile Native Americans.1 The Lone Ranger exclaimed,
‘Indians! Indians, all around us! Well, Tonto… it looks like we’re finished!’ To which
Tonto replied ‘What do you mean…we?’
The joke became well known. Some see it as racist, framing Indigenous people such as
Tonto (‘fool,’ in Spanish) as traitors or cowards. Others see it as subversive, celebrating a
subaltern who turns the tables on his clueless white boss. I suggest it be considered in
a third way, as an interrogation into the unstable ‘structure of governance’ on settler-colo-
nial frontiers. What do settlers mean by ‘we’? Who, if anyone, is ‘them’? Can ‘we’ absorb
‘them,’ as the Lone Ranger seeks to do? Can ‘they’ resist, as Tonto does?
‘Structure of governance’ questions may seem esoteric. Yet the answers they generate
are the foundation that political regimes are built on. Beneath all our systems of authority –
our customs services, deeds-and-titles offices, election commissions, war councils – are
fragile claims about who ‘we’ are and how and where we should rule. Which is why,
when those claims become contested, regimes may come tumbling down.
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That is one way, albeit unusual, to think about settler colonialism – the conversion of
native domains into New Frances, New Englands, New Zealands and so forth. Though
the tools employed by settlers are diverse, encompassing treaties, Bibles, boarding
schools and Gatling guns, their goal is simple: to make ‘theirs’ ours. One way of doing
that is by revising the pre-colonial ‘structure of governance,’ to make ‘them’ us.
Like other settler states, Canada has experienced such a revision. By the First World War,
Indigenous peoples had largely been swallowed into the Canadian body politic. The Métis
were pacified, First Nations were subjects of the Indian Act, and treaties had converted tra-
ditional Indigenous territories into domestic jurisdictions.2 Yet a sort of frontier remained,
roughly coinciding with the vast, unincorporated Northwest Territories (NWT). There, for
much of the past half century, Indigenous peoples and a booming settler population jock-
eyed for control, striving to shape government in their own image. They battled, in part,
over the NWT’s structure of governance – over who composes the demos and how
decisions should be made. Settlers, with numbers on their side, sought to frame the struc-
ture of governance as universally inclusive. Indigenous peoples resisted: ‘What do you
mean…we?’
I suggest that, by examining this conflict, certain modern settler-colonial dynamics may
be revealed. I break these dynamics into four strands.
First, I suggest that settlers, to reshape the NWT’s ‘structure of governance,’ have brand-
ished a novel ‘tool of elimination’: individual rights to voting, mobility and expression. This
tool has received little attention, save from scholars like Rohrer.3 Building on her work, I
secondly suggest that settlers employed such rights in a specific, strategic, two-pronged
way, condemning as ‘illiberal’ those voting, mobility and expression laws that flow from
Indigenous sovereignty and then swapping in ostensibly race-neutral laws that in effect
would enthrone settlers. Third, building on the ‘structure of governance’ scholarship of
the likes of Issacharoff4 and Pildes,5 and on Fraser’s6 theory of ‘abnormal justice,’ I
suggest that how these rights-cases were resolved hinged on how they were framed –
on whether courts saw the appropriate subject of justice as the universal individual or
the ‘constitutionally prior’ demos. Finally, I show that, where the court ruled on individ-
ual-rights grounds, settlers extended control over the ‘structure of governance,’ thereby
‘colonizing the demos.’
To explore these dynamics, I proceed thusly. In section two I lay out a theory of settler-
colonial challenges to pre-colonial ‘structures of democracy.’ In section three I introduce
the fraught political history of the NWT. In section four, I examine two controversial law-
suits, Allman et al. v Commissioner of the Northwest Territories (1983) and Friends of Democ-
racy v. Northwest Territories (Commissioner) (1999), in which settlers in the NWT charged
that their rights to voting, mobility and expression were violated by Indigenous-domi-
nated decisions concerning the structure of governance. In section five, I analyze those
cases against the backdrop of the aforementioned theory, and then conclude.
Theory
The structure of governance
Democracy is conventionally understood as ‘rule by the people.’ But who are the people,
and how should they rule? Paradoxically, these puzzles cannot be solved democratically.
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The first is political theory’s infamous ‘boundary problem,’ well stated by Jennings: ‘The
people cannot decide until someone decides who are the people.’7 The second puzzle
is no easier – the people cannot decide until someone decides by what rules decisions
should be made.
Issacharoff characterizes these as first-order decisions, foundational and thus ‘constitu-
tionally prior’ to democracy.8 Ideally, such decisions are fixed before a government is up
and running. In the classic American case, the federal demoi were identified, and their
shares of power allotted, during the framing of the Constitution. The Great Compromise
was just that – a ‘structure of governance’ deal, hammered out between the big and
small states, so everyone could get on with other business.
What other business? For one, formalizing what I will call second-order political arrange-
ments, which address how power is to be exercised once governance is underway.
Second-order matters include rules and rights that fall under what is sometimes termed
‘the law of democracy’9 – the guidelines of the democratic process. These guidelines
govern everything from campaign funding to durational-residency requirements to elec-
toral districting. Unlike first-order arrangements, second-order laws of democracy attach
to individuals, not demoi. Rather than enshrining collective self-determination, they
guard difference-blind and egalitarian liberal principles.
Yet as American federalism makes clear, first-order decisions complexly entwine with
second-order ones. Take the aforementioned Great Compromise. Because of it, California,
the most populous state, and Wyoming, the least, enjoy equal representation in the U.S.
Senate. Though this is a first-order arrangement, it has staggering consequences ‘down-
stream,’ for the second-order law of democracy. There, the federal voting power of individ-
ual Californians is a fraction that of Wyomingites. Normally this would be untenable,
transgressing ‘one person, one vote.’ However, since the Great Compromise is constitu-
tionally entrenched, Californians have no legal recourse. The flow of consequences
cannot be reversed to wash upstream.
But elsewhere this may not be the case. Demotic boundaries are not always drawn,
much less enshrined, pre-politically. First-order conflicts may burst into the arena of every-
day politics when there develops a fervent demand to re-level the foundations of govern-
ance.10 Around the world, constitutionally prior questions are emerging with increasing
frequency, taking diverse forms. What is to be done when a faction locks up power via ger-
rymandering? How should shares of power be distributed among consociating polities?
Should annexed peoples retain a measure of sovereignty, or be merged into the
broader state demos? May a restive group break away?
With democracy incapable of answering these dilemmas, courts are increasingly step-
ping in.11 Pildes calls this the ‘constitutionalization of democratic politics.’12 Hirschl counts
it part of the ‘judicialization of mega-politics.’13 Fraser would place it in the burgeoning
field of ‘abnormal justice.’14 Famous first-order cases include the European Court of
Human Rights’ decisions on the legality of power sharing in Belgium15 and Bosnia,16 the
German Federal Constitutional Court’s ruling on joining the Maastricht Treaty,17 the
Supreme Court of Canada’s Quebec Secession Reference,18 and the U.S. Supreme Court’s
revolutionary redistricting decisions, such as Reynolds v. Sims.19
All first-order cases are difficult. They revisit potentially fraught bargains that were
struck, or awkward realities that were sidestepped, at the time of state-making. (Rhetori-
cally, Tierney suggests, ‘why not let sleeping dogs lie rather than invite a confrontation
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over inclusion and exclusion.’20) Too, where first-order questions are emergent, they
cannot be tackled in the vacuum of a constitutional convention. They must be grappled
with in medias res, with demoi already dug in, powers divvied up, and turf jealously
guarded.21
Even more vexingly, first-order cases can be hard to distinguish, or disentangle,
from second-order cases. Individual plaintiffs may protest ethnic discrimination that
ensues from an upstream consociational compromise, as in the aforementioned
Bosnian Sejdić and Finci case. Or, they may allege that their voting power is unfairly
diluted as a consequence of a first-order power-sharing agreement, as in the German
Maastricht case. In such cases, courts may find themselves unmoored. As Fraser notes,
‘normal justice’ is simply about balancing the scale: a bit left, a tad right, and equilibrium
is achieved. But in ‘abnormal’ conditions, where pre-political assumptions are in dispute,
Fraser suggests judges must take a step back and begin with first-order questions.
What is the appropriate scale to use? Who is the rightful subject of justice? How should
justice be framed?
Though seemingly abstract, these questions are elemental. This is because, in abnormal
justice, the frame often foreordains the result. Take the aforementioned Reynolds case.
There, the plaintiff charged that apportioning Alabama state senate seats equally by
county diluted his voting power, violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution’s
Fourteenth Amendment. Alabama countered with the ‘federal analogy’: The U.S. Senate
apportions equally by state, so why can’t we apportion equally by county? Chief Justice
Warren deemed this analogy ‘inapposite,’ writing, ‘Political subdivisions of states – coun-
ties, cities, or whatever – never were and never have been considered as sovereign enti-
ties.’22 In effect, he denied that Alabama’s political subdivisions bear first-order demotic
rights. The sole legitimate subject of justice was deemed to be the plaintiff, owed ‘one
person, one vote.’ As history shows, this finding flowed upstream. The first-order structure
of governance of almost every state was radically amended.
It can be seen, then, that demotic bounding complexly interlinks with everyday demo-
cratic rules. Hence, scholars have urged judges to enter this realm with caution.23 Issa-
charoff warns of the danger of overlooking first-order implications: ‘[C]ourts should be
wary of following their impulses to treat such… conflicts about the structure of political
systems as familiar claims of individual rights.’24 Fraser fears the opposite, that the founda-
tional integrity of the state will overshadow second-order pleas for justice. But her solution
is the same: Judges must be cognizant of how justice is framed. To do this, they must adju-
dicate ‘reflexively,’ grappling with what scale of justice to use before trying to level the
balance.25
I suggest there is even greater cause for judicial caution. First-order cases may be stra-
tegically camouflaged as second-order cases. Despite appearances, plaintiffs’ primary
objective may not be to liberalize the law but, quite conversely, to shake up the foun-
dations of governance so their own group comes to dominate. This might occur where
remedying second-order illiberalism would have an upstream effect, undermining pre-pol-
itical first order arrangements, much as occurred in Reynolds. As I will show next, such
caution is especially warranted in cases of settler colonialism.
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Settler-colonialism and the structure of governance
As Wolfe famously observed, settler colonialism is an insidious and especially resilient
variant of conventional colonialism. Impelled by what he terms a ‘logic of elimination,’
settler-colonists kill, expel, confine or assimilate the locals, seize their homelands, and
found ‘a new colonial society on the expropriated land base.’26 He emphasizes that this
is a two-phase process – that ‘settler colonialism destroys to replace,’27 with Native dissol-
ution preceding settler installation. In this manner, Wolfe says, settler-colonialism sup-
plants Indigenous civilizations with new versions of the settler motherland.
Much has been written about how settler states advance colonial projects using the
language of rights.28 For example, Kymlicka, discussing the Global South and Eastern
Europe, observes that states engaged in ‘demographic engineering’ – moving settlers
into restive minority regions – may condemn as illiberal those arrangements that guard
minority autonomy. He thus concludes, ‘where ethnocultural justice is absent, the
rhetoric and practice of human rights may actually worsen the situation.’29 Scholars
such as Hoxie have showed how rhetoric concerning ‘freedom’ and ‘equality’ have
been deployed in U.S. Indian policy; perhaps the most notorious reserve-land allotment
law, the Dawes Act, was hailed by government officials as the ‘Indians’ Magna Carta.’30
Similarly, Eisenberg, writing about Canada, notes that the expansion of settler-state
constitutionalism into subaltern jurisdictions may be passed off as liberalization
when in fact it is the opposite – a tool ‘aimed at advancing the collective cultural dom-
inance of the majority.’31
Far less has been said about how settlers, pursuing a ‘logic of elimination,’ have in
recent decades sought to wield rights, moving them from the realm of rhetoric into the
arena of the courts. This article explores that tactic, showing how assertions of settler
rights regarding voting, mobility and expression were employed in an effort to undermine
the first-order foundations of Indigenous governance – to alter the answer to ‘who are the
people and how should they rule?’ Where Indigenous peoples were once sovereign, set-
tlers strived to dissolve that sovereignty, overturning the pre-colonial order, flipping the
demos from ‘them’ to ‘us.’
As Wolfe might predict, settlers may employ voting rights through a two-phase
approach. Rohrer discerned this approach in her analysis of the 2000 U.S. Supreme
Court case Rice v. Cayetano. She observes that the settler plaintiffs in Rice first ‘proble-
matize[d] collective native identity’ and then ‘naturalize[d] white settler subjectivity via
a color-blind ideology.’32 Specifically, settlers first charged that existing laws of democ-
racy violated second-order individual voting rights, conflating those violations with the
epiphenomenal, downstream effects of first-order Indigenous sovereignty. By framing
Indigenous peoples as citizens seeking to illiberally subject fellow citizens to racial dis-
crimination, rather than as a pre-political sovereign exercising self-determination, Indi-
genous polities were toppled from their demotic throne. The second settler move
was to appeal for the law to be reformed so as to treat individuals equally. Such liberal-
ization can have transformative upstream impacts, installing the broader, settler-domi-
nated demos in power.
Hence I suggest that, per the aforementioned warnings, courts should be cautious of
(mis)framing settler constitutional challenges as second-order appeals to liberal fairness.
Rather, such challenges may be more coherently understood as camouflaged attacks on
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Indigenous structures of governance, with settlers deploying rights not to liberalize but to
dominate – to ‘colonize the demos.’
To examine the above strategy, I turn now to Canada’s NWT, where settler/Indigenous
relations have long been fraught.
The Northwest Territories
One of Canada’s 13 federal subunits, the NWT sprawls across 1.35 million square kilo-
mteres of Arctic and Subarctic terrain. For milennia it was an exclusively Indigenous home-
land.33 Even after settlers overwhelmed the rest of North America, the NWT remained a
place apart. Before the First World War the settler population of the NWT was negligible.34
Canada administered the territory remotely from Ottawa, at times treating it as an Indigen-
ous reserve, vast stretches of which were effectively off limits to non-Natives.35 Significant
settlement commenced only after the Second World War, and was mostly limited to the
mining town of Yellowknife. In 1967 the federal government began devolving authority
to the NWT, with Yellowknife becoming the capital.
Today Indigenous people predominate in rural areas of the NWT while settlers fill Yel-
lowknife. The two groups are almost precisely equipopulous.36 Not all ethnoculturally
plural jurisdictions are ‘divided,’ yet as Choudhry notes, where lines between groups are
stark, pluralism can have immoderating effects on political behavior.37 Such is true in
the NWT. In the 1970s, as Indigenous peoples began to mobilize politically,38 and as Yel-
lowknife swelled with settlers, the NWT became one of the last frontiers of full-blown
settler/Indigenous conflict in North America.39
Initially, settlers enjoyed the upper hand. With influence in Ottawa, and control of the
territorial government,40 they strived to shape the NWT into a standard Anglo-Canadian
province. Jull, writing in 1978, observed that
[t]he white people are very conscious of the fact that they’re building a new society, but it isn’t
new in any qualitative way.… For them there is no interest in new forms of organization but
rather getting the proven Canadian ones, pronto, and dominating them.41
Indigenous leaders condemned the settler government as ‘transitional and illegiti-
mate.’42 Key Indigenous groups boycotted it.43 Indigenous leaders instead pressed
for self-determination,44 insisting territorial governance be overhauled. Inuit lobbied
for a territory of their own, to be called Nunavut. The remaining Indigenous population
floated proposals such as forming a ‘province-like’ jurisdiction called ‘Denendeh,’45
which would feature a fully Indigenous senate armed with veto power, and where
voters would have to meet a 10-year residency requirement,46 disenfranchizing most
settlers. The NWT government decried such proposals as ‘abhorrent.’47 The federal gov-
ernment agreed, stating, ‘there is no place in Canada for governments based on race
or ethnicity.’48
In 1981, however, NWT voters elected an Indigenous-dominated government.49 It
embraced Indigenous land claims, including the aforementioned Nunavut proposal,
which came into being in 1999. As well, it made a habit of apportioning assembly seats
such that rural Indigenous districts enjoyed substantial overrepresentation vis-à-vis
settler-dominated Yellowknife.50 Hence, despite growing settler numbers, assembly
members were disproportionately Indigenous throughout the 1980s and ‘90s.
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Scholars followed these developments with intrigue. They termed the NWT ‘the most
distinctive society within Canada’51 and ‘a laboratory for students of political represen-
tation.’52 Jull called the conflict in the NWT ‘[n]ot healthy dissent to be resolved by the
ballot box, but [a] fundamental dispute about whose country it is and what the ground
rules are.’53 Dacks observed that
of all jurisdictions in Canada, only in the NWT does the question still remain open as to which
political philosophy – liberalism based on the individual, nationalism based on ethnic identity,
or consociationalism which attempts to integrate the two – will ultimately guide the political
process.54
At first, the NWT’s settler/Indigenous conflict was fought mostly through appeals to public
opinion, petitioning federal officials, and territorial electoral politics. In 1982, new weapons
became available. Canada, which to that point had lacked a substantive bill of rights or
active judicial review, adopted the Constitution Act, 1982 and the associated Charter of
Rights and Freedoms.
Those documents, for the first time, entrenched Indigenous rights. Section 35 of the
constitution affirmed certain Indigenous ‘existing rights,’ which (as will be discussed
below) were in time deemed to include the ‘inherent right of self-government.’ Mean-
while, section 25 of the Charter, often called the ‘non-derogation clause,’ anticipated
clashes between individual and Indigenous rights, buffering – perhaps even blocking –
diminution of the latter.55
Yet the Charter also spelled out rights owed to all Canadians, including settlers. Section
2 protects ‘fundamental freedoms,’ including freedom of expression. Section 3 guarantees
that ‘Every citizen has a right to vote in an election of members of the House of Commons
or of a legislative assembly and to be qualified for membership therein.’ Section 6
enshrines the right ‘to move to and take up residence in any province.’
As I will now show, almost immediately, settlers took up these rights to challenge the
Indigenous-controlled NWT government.
The cases
Allman et al. v the commissioner of the Northwest Territories
Allman was heard by the NWT Supreme Court in January 1983. Margaret Louise Allman
and 10 other applicants charged that the territory’s new Plebiscite Ordinance violated
their Charter-protected rights. The ordinance had been enacted in preparation for an
April 1982 plebiscite on whether to divide the territory to form the new Inuit-majority ter-
ritory of Nunavut. Though the plebiscite was legally non-binding, the territorial govern-
ment had vowed to respect its outcome. Unlike in territorial elections, where citizens
qualified to vote after just one year of residency, the new ordinance limited voting in ple-
biscites to residents of three years or more. The applicants, all of whom had lived in the
NWT between one and three years, met the regular-election criterion but were ineligible
to vote in the plebiscite.
Legislative-assembly records and media and scholarly discussions make clear that the
plebiscite was polarized along settler/Indigenous lines. In crafting the plebiscite bill, some
Indigenous assembly members championed a residency requirement of at least 10 years,
‘to have these long-term decisions made by the native people.’56 In turn, they decried their
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most vocal opponent, a settler member representing Yellowknife, as ‘the number one
enemy of the people of the North.’57 Of course, the vast majority of residents disqualified
by the three-year requirement were settlers. Abele and Dickerson note the plebiscite was
‘part of an overall Native strategy to shape novel… governing institutions for the North-
west Territories.’58 Settlers largely opposed that strategy. Unsurprisingly, the plebiscite’s
results were split by race, with nine of the NWT’s 10 majority-settler communities opposing
division and 17 of the 24 majority-Indigenous communities supporting it.59 Overall, the
pro-division vote was 56 percent. It can be assumed that, had the plebiscite ordinance
not barred newly arrived settlers, the result would have been closer.
Significantly, Allman and the other applicants did not challenge the validity of the ple-
biscite itself, which had been held three days before the Charter came into effect. Rather,
they challenged the enabling ordinance, claiming it abridged their section 2 right to
freedom of expression or, alternately, their section 6 right to freedom of mobility. They
further argued that these abridgements were not ‘saved’ by the Charter’s section 1 ‘limit-
ations clause,’ as the three-year requirement was abnormally long – six times the Canadian
average – and so fell outside ‘reasonable limits… demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society.’ They maintained that, even if the plebiscite’s results could not be ret-
roactively invalidated, the law should be amended as ‘there is a reasonable expectation
that the ordinance will be used again.’60
The respondent, the government of the NWT, disagreed. It argued that the three-year
requirement was justified given the exceptional circumstances of the NWT. It wrote:
the Canadian North faces problems which are unique in Canada.… People come from the
south part of Canada and work or live in the Territories for a year or two or three and then
return south again. It is not surprising nor is it unreasonable that the Legislative Assembly
of the Northwest Territories should wish a means to find out the views of the long-term resi-
dents of the Northwest Territories. They are the people who will be most affected by decisions
of a long-term nature.61
In January 1983, NWT Supreme Court Justice Mark de Weerdt issued his ruling, finding in
favor of the Indigenous-controlled government.62 He ruled largely on technical grounds.
Per the text of the Charter, he wrote, section 3 voting rights cover elections, not plebiscites.
This, he surmised, was why the applicants had hung their case on section 2, freedom of
expression. But he found freedom of expression relates to speech and the press, not
voting. Likewise, de Weerdt ruled that section 6, concerning freedom of mobility, was irre-
levant –despite the plebiscite ordinance, the applicants had successfully takenup residence
in the NWT. Finding no Charter violations, de Weerdt made no comment on whether limit-
ing voting to ‘long-term residents,’ rather than people ‘from the south part of Canada,’was a
constitutional government objective. The plebiscite ordinance was allowed to stand.
Friends of democracy v. Northwest Territories (commissioner)
Friends was heard in the NWT Supreme Court in January 1999. A group of residents of
settler-dominated Yellowknife, including the city’s mayor, charged that the territory’s
latest electoral-districting map violated their Charter voting rights. As with the 1982 ple-
biscite, the run-up to the 1998 redistricting had been racially charged. A series of legal
and demographic developments had converged to make the redistricting exercise a
crucial battle in the NWT’s long-running Indigenous/settler power struggle.
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The first development favored Indigenous interests. In 1995, the federal Liberal govern-
ment had issued the ‘Inherent Right Policy,’ proposing ways to implement section 35 Indi-
genous self-government rights. One avenue, which it deemed especially applicable to the
NWT, was through ‘specific guarantees within public government institutions.’63 In the
NWT there followed a flurry of high-level efforts to forge a new constitution establishing
Indigenous/settler power-sharing. While many settlers were deeply opposed to this idea,
compromise seemed inevitable. ‘A balance will be struck between these contending
forces,’ Dacks predicted. ‘The question is where exactly the balance will lie on the axis
between self-government and public government.’64
The second development favored settlers. Following adoption of the Charter, the
specter of a voting-rights challenge loomed over the NWT’s malapportioned electoral
map. In 1983, during the first post-Charter redistricting, the NWT’s electoral-boundaries
commission split over whether to bolster representation in Yellowknife, with the two Indi-
genous commissioners opposed and the sole settler commissioner insisting that the prin-
ciple of representation by population ‘cannot be ignored.’65 In the next redistricting, in
1989, the entire electoral-boundaries commission recommended a new seat for Yellow-
knife. Some Yellowknife assembly members insisted the Charter required at least two
new seats.66 Under constitutional pressure, the assembly approved the commission’s pro-
posed new map. In White’s analysis of the 1989 apportionment, he noted that,
unprecedentedly,
the Charter forced the commission to concentrate on the equality of individual voters.… [T]o
the extent that northern political distinctiveness is more than an exotic curiosity, but rep-
resents a political response to the unique political problems of the North, this is not a positive
development.67
With the two above developments placing Indigenous self-determination and individual
voting rights in tension, the third development ratcheted the tension higher. The
eastern half of the NWT was set to become Nunavut in 1999. The demographics of the
remaining, western NWT would thus transform, from a decisive Indigenous majority to
an even split between Indigenous residents and settlers. For settlers, this would represent
a dramatic gain; it would, noted Dacks, give them little incentive ‘to support a consti-
tutional innovation that would undermine the majoritarian principle.’68 The opposite
would be true for Indigenous people. Without entrenching Indigenous self-government,
the post-division demographic situation would open them to domination by settlers.
In June 1998, a boundaries commission was empaneled to redraw the NWT electoral
map in preparation for Nunavut’s departure. Both settler and Indigenous actors knew
their political future hinged on how many seats would be assigned to their respective fac-
tions. That decision, in turn, hinged on the rules of electoral-boundary making. The com-
mission conducted hearings, in which Indigenous communities expressed ‘substantial
concern… about being “overwhelmed” by Yellowknife.’69 In settler-dominated Yellow-
knife, meanwhile, ‘the majority…wanted to see the electoral districts changed to
reflect the principle of “representation by population.”’70 The commission called for two
more seats in Yellowknife. In November 1998, in an explosive session of the legislative
assembly, Yellowknife and Indigenous legislators dueled over the competing values of
electoral parity and Indigenous self-determination. The commission’s recommendation
was voted down and the status quo preserved. Yellowknife, home to 44 percent of the
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territory’s residents, was left with 29 percent of assembly seats. Two Yellowknife districts
dramatically exceeded Canada’s generally accepted constitutional limit of 25 percent var-
iance above parity. One district, Yellowknife South, exceeded parity by 152 percent. The
next day, the Friends lawsuit was announced.
The applicants, in presenting their case to the court, claimed the underrepresentation
of Yellowknife districts denied them ‘effective representation’ – the electoral-districting
standard established by Justice Beverley McLachlin in the Supreme Court of Canada’s con-
trolling Carter case. The applicants further argued that such underrepresentation was not
redeemed by the territory’s distinctive ‘historical and social context,’ nor by difficulties pro-
viding ‘ombudsperson’ representation to rural and isolated electoral districts. The NWT,
they stated, ‘is not so different that fundamental democratic principles do not apply.’71
The applicants finally challenged the objection that adding Yellowknife seats would
upset the territory’s ethnonational ‘balance of power.’ This view, they argued, ‘represent[s]
a fundamental misapprehension of the right to vote under section 3. The section 3
right is an individual right,’72 not a right owed to ethnonational collectivities.
The respondents, the Indigenous-dominated NWT government, defended the
impugned boundary map. They too quoted Justice McLachlin – not from Carter, but
from Dixon, a case she had decided while head of the British Columbia Supreme Court.
There, McLachlin had ruled that ‘departure from the ideal of absolute equality may not
constitute breach of section 3 of the Charter so long as the departure can be objectively
justified as contributing to better government of the populace as a whole.’73 In the NWT,
the respondents argued, the goal of ‘better government’ had always trumped strict voter
parity. Since the territory’s first apportionment, territorial leaders had ‘accepted that Yel-
lowknife would be underrepresented in favor of the smaller communities with Aboriginal
majorities.’74 This arrangement compensated for rural disadvantages related to ‘ombud-
sperson’ service, provided effective representation to small but culturally distinct ‘commu-
nities of interest,’ and facilitated tacit power-sharing between the territory’s discrete
cultures. The respondents closed by stating that the NWT ‘is unique and deserving of a
northern solution which… could be the envy of any jurisdiction with a significant Abori-
ginal population.’75
A submission to the court was also made by intervening parties representing the NWT’s
key Indigenous organizations. They grounded their case explicitly in Indigenous rights.76
Providing Yellowknife with more assembly seats, they maintained, would impede
ongoing efforts to negotiate and implement the ‘inherent right’ of Indigenous self-govern-
ment, protected under the constitution’s section 35. Thus, they said, even if the territory’s
electoral map contravened section 3 voting rights, this contravention was shielded by the
Charter’s section 25, the Indigenous ‘non-derogation’ clause, which buffers Indigenous
rights when they conflict with other Charter provisions.
The Friends decision, handed down in March 1999, was, like Allman, penned by Justice
de Weerdt. He stated that the question before the court was ‘whether the underrepresen-
tation of voters at Yellowknife… is in violation of section 3 of the Charter.’77 He ruled it
was. Addressing the government’s submission, he agreed that, given the NWT’s distinctive
geographical features, ‘ombudsperson’ representation was doubtlessly difficult in isolated
rural districts. Hence, he said, many of those districts had been apportioned fewer constitu-
ents than the territorial average. Having done so, why additionally impair urban electors by
making their districts exceptionally large? The more justifiable solution, he argued, would
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be to expand the legislature, preserving small districts while giving new seats to
Yellowknife.78
De Weerdt next addressed ‘balance of power.’ While careful not to concede that this
issue was germane to the case, he suggested that, regardless, it was moot. Providing Yel-
lowknife with two more seats, as the boundaries commission had recommended, would
still leave the city’s legislative share at just six of 16, a clear minority.79 He took a similarly
dim view of arguments concerning Indigenous rights. The section 35 rights the intervenors
claimed were threatened, he declared, were at best ‘process rights,’ relating to ‘nego-
tiations over the future self-government of Aboriginal or other groups which might yet
take decades to bring to a conclusion.’80 Further, given the central role of voting in democ-
racy, he questioned whether Indigenous rights could ever trump voting rights: ‘[N]either
the existence nor the due exercise of that right should depend on the leave… of any gov-
ernment or executive authority, be it in relation to the negotiation or enjoyment of any
Aboriginal land claim or other Aboriginal treaty right.’81 De Weerdt ordered the electoral
map be redrawn.
Analysis and conclusion
I contend that these two legal battles in Canada’s NWT – Allman v. Northwest Territories and
Friends of Democracy v. Northwest Territories – showcase a web of modern settler-colonial
strategies deployed in an effort to colonize Indigenous ‘structures of democracy.’ From this
web, at least four distinct strands may be teased out.
First, Allman and Friends both highlight the use of a novel and understudied settler
‘tool of elimination’: individual rights. In Allman, the settler plaintiffs charged that the
NWT’s plebiscite ordinance infringed their individual rights to free expression and mobi-
lity guaranteed under sections 2 and 6 of Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In
Friends, settlers alleged violation of their section 3 voting rights. Free-expression, mobi-
lity and voting are rights of the second-order variety, concerning ‘laws of democracy.’
They attach to individuals, not to first-order polities, and are at first blush unrelated to
the pre-political, ‘structure of governance’ questions ‘who are the people, and how
should they rule?’ Yet settlers have used these rights to challenge Indigenous self-gov-
ernment such as that guaranteed by the constitution’s section 35, as well as to chal-
lenge Indigenous decolonial projects such as the formation of Nunavut and the
entrenchment of consociational power sharing in the NWT. Clearly, in the NWT, individ-
ual rights have been harnessed as a tool of settler-colonialism.
Second, in both Allman and Friends the plaintiffs employed a specific strategy involving
dual moves of destruction and then construction. I suggest this strategy reflects Wolfe’s
assessment that settler-colonialism ‘destroys to replace.’82 Even more precisely, I
suggest these dual moves were presciently discerned by Rohrer, who, in analyzing the
U.S. Supreme Court case Rice v. Cayetano, observed that settler-rights claimants sought
to ‘problematize collective native identity’ and then ‘naturalize white settler subjectivity
via a color-blind ideology.’ Let me try to trace this dynamic.
As noted, the plaintiffs in both Allman and Friends claimed their rights were violated by
NWT laws. The impugned laws were distinctly ‘laws of democracy.’ They were downstream
effects of a pre-political ‘structure of governance,’ designed to treat the NWT’s Indigenous
peoples as a first-order, rights-bearing demos. The NWT government articulated this view
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in its submissions to the courts. In Allman, the government maintained that the impugned
voting restrictions flowed from its desire to poll ‘long term residents’ about ‘an issue of a
long term nature’ – that is, to provide Indigenous residents with decision-making power
over the creation of Nunavut. In so doing, the NWT government, for the purposes of ple-
biscitary voting, framed the demos in a manner predominantly comprising Indigenous
people, exercising self-determination.
In Friends, meanwhile, the government testified that any underrepresentation of Yel-
lowknife voters was merely a downstream consequence of pre-political arrangements
to achieve ‘better government.’ Overweighting the NWT’s Indigenous polity, and thus
promoting inter-polity power sharing in the NWT assembly, was, the government
suggested, ‘a northern solution which… could be the envy of any jurisdiction with a
significant Aboriginal population.’ The Indigenous intervenors were more explicit,
deeming overrepresentation to be a section 35 right owed to the Indigenous demos.
This right was especially relevant in 1999, when the NWT’s proportion of settlers was
about to leap, and when efforts to entrench Indigenous/settler power sharing hung
in the balance.
In both Allman and Friends, the plaintiffs’ legal challenges seemed intended to under-
mine these ‘structures of democracy.’ In this manner, as Rohrer put it, ‘collective native
identity’ would be ‘problematized.’ This may be seen as Wolfe’s initial dimension of
settler colonialism, where Indigenous political selfhood is targeted for destruction.
But of course, in both Allman and Friends, settlers appealed not merely for the
impugned ‘laws of democracy’ to be invalidated, but for them to be liberalized. This
move too might seem an innocuous second-order appeal, to make laws regarding
expression, mobility and voting fair to all. As Rohrer again discerned, such a move
would ‘naturalize white settler subjectivity via a color-blind ideology.’ In Allman, settlers
requested that, in case of another plebiscite, durational-residency requirements be shor-
tened to match those elsewhere in Canada. Likewise, the Friends plaintiffs asked that
the territory’s electoral map be redrawn in a more egalitarian fashion. Both of these
changes would inevitably flow upstream, altering the ‘structure of governance.’ In both
plebiscitary voting and electoral districting, the NWT demos would be recast to consist
of relatively equal, undifferentiated individuals. This would dramatically empower settlers,
whose numbers were booming, providing them with greater control over not only every-
day politics but also over territorial (de)colonization. This may be seen as exemplifying
Wolfe’s constructive dimension of settler colonialism, in which the Indigenous political
self is replaced by that of settlers.
Third, it is evident that the success of this settler strategy hinges, at least in part, on how
justice is framed – on whether courts see the relevant rights-bearers as second-order uni-
versal individuals or as the first-order Indigenous demos.
In the Allman decision, Justice de Weerdt interpreted settler rights narrowly, deeming
no justiciable violation to have occurred. He let the status quo stand, taking no overt pos-
ition on the question ‘who are the people, and how should they rule.’ He thus stayed clear
of the proverbial ‘political thicket,’ in effect evading the first-order question at hand.
But in Friends, de Weerdt deemed that settlers’ section 3 voting rights had been
abridged. He thus faced a dilemma: Was this abridgement indefensible, or was it,
instead, the epiphenomenal, downstream effect of a protected first-order structure? Put
another way, was Indigenous domination in the NWT, like the overweighting of small
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states in the U.S. Senate, constitutionally justified? Or were the NWT’s Indigenous peoples
more like the Alabama counties in Reynolds – pretenders to the throne, who ‘never were
and never have been considered as sovereign entities’? The plaintiffs argued the latter, dis-
puting the notion that voting rights should take into account concerns such as ‘better gov-
ernment’ or the securing of ‘a northern solution.’ That notion, the plaintiffs said, is ‘a
fundamental misapprehension of the right to vote.’
De Weerdt agreed. Apparently seeing Friends in what I have called second-order terms,
he declined to consider whether the impugned section 3 violation was the downstream
effect of a legitimate structure of governance. And, he refused to accept that liberalizing
the law would have unconstitutional upstream effects. To the NWT government he noted
that, despite added representation in Yellowknife, the balance of power in the assembly
might not change. To the Indigenous intervenors he stated that their section 25 and 35
rights could not block such changes. Sharing the settler plaintiffs’ views, he in effect
ruled that, for the purposes of redistricting, the territory’s proper demos was one compris-
ing all residents as relatively undifferentiated individuals.
Fourth and finally, Allman and Friends show that, where settler-colonists strategically
assert indivudal rights to voting, mobility and expression, and where justice is framed
so as to validate that strategy, a conquest of the Indigenous structure of governance
may result. Settlers, able to dissolve the Indigenous ‘them’ into the settler ‘we,’ may
achieve power over Indigenous peoples and lands.
Following the Allman decision, the applicants appealed all the way to the Supreme
Court of Canada. In May 1984 the court denied their application without comment. Mean-
while, the territorial government, as promised, appealed to the federal government to let
Inuit form their own territory. A second plebiscite was held, in 1992, again with a three-
year residency requirement, to establish the precise border between the NWT and
Nunavut. In April 1999, to great fanfare, Nunavut came into being – a widely cited exem-
plar of Indigenous decolonization.
But where Allman paved the way for Nunavut, Friends plunged the NWT into a ‘consti-
tutional crisis.’83 The territorial government, its hands tied by the ruling, added five new
assembly seats, three in Yellowknife and two in mixed settler/Indigenous communities.
The territory’s premier, a longtime Indigenous leader, called the change ‘a bitter pill
and… a shift in power.’84 To forestall that shift, the territory’s leading Indigenous-rights
organization took the remarkable step of imploring the federal government to dissolve
the assembly. (Said the organization’s co-chair, ‘the imbalance we have always feared is
upon us.’85) The federal government declined. After a quarter-century of effort, work on
settler/Indigenous power sharing in the NWT ceased.86 Indigenous groups switched
focus, abandoning collaboration with the territorial government and instead seeking
self-rule through so-called ‘treaty federal’ arrangements. By 2003 the first such self-rule
arrangement was established, providing a standalone ethnic government to the territory’s
most populous Indigenous group, the Tłįcho .
Thereafter, setter/Indigenous conflict in the NWT became more muted. Still, electoral
redistricting remained contested. In the 2006 redistricting, the electoral boundaries com-
mission recommended two new seats, in Yellowknife and a fast-growing Indigenous com-
munity. The assembly rejected this proposal, sticking to the status quo. Yellowknife
members raised the specter of another Charter challenge,87 but none was launched. In
the 2013 redistricting, the assembly again refused appeals for new Yellowknife seats.
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Instead, the assembly adjusted Yellowknife’s seven districts so all were near, but none
above, 25-percent deviation from parity. The City of Yellowknife launched a lawsuit,
rooted largely in procedural arguments. It was easily defeated, with the court ruling
that the redistricting did not impair Yellowknife residents’ ‘effective representation.’
This article has shown that settlers may employ rights-claims as a tool of elimination,
with a transformational goal – to ‘colonize the demos.’ Settler-colonialism can in part
be understood as an effort to flip the existing structure of governance from ‘them’
to ‘us.’ Settlers employ rights to alter the normative and legal answers to the founda-
tional first-order questions ‘who are the people, and how should they rule?’ Pre-
colonially, Indigenous peoples formed the demoi of their homelands, governing
through Indigenous self-determination. Settler-colonialism strives to redefine the
demos as ‘all of us.’ In this new demos, settlers are of course numerically predominant,
and may govern by majority rule. In this way, settlers seek to enact Wolfe’s ‘logic of
elimination,’ displacing Indigenous sovereigns and ‘erect[ing] a new colonial society
on the expropriated land base.’88
This article thus shows Issacharoff is correct that ‘[C]ourts should be wary of following
their impulses to treat… conflicts about the structure of political systems as familiar claims
of individual rights.’89 This is because, to upend the demos, settlers may camouflage first-
order cases as second-order cases. Per Rohrer, they may do this through dual strategic
moves. The first move is to ‘problematize collective native identity’ and the next is to ‘nat-
uralize white settler subjectivity via a color-blind ideology.’90 Put simply, settlers attack as
illiberal those second-order laws that are the epiphenomenal, downstream consequence
of first-order Indigenous sovereignty – durational-residency constraints on settler voting,
underrepresentation of settlers, and so forth. In doing so, settlers frame the Indigenous
governors as a racial group subjecting people of another race to illiberal treatment,
rather than as a pre-political sovereign exercising legitimate national self-determination.
Settlers then demand that the second-order laws be liberalized. If courts do not find
that the first-order structure of Indigenous sovereignty is constitutionally entrenched
and/or otherwise legitimate, then the ensuing liberalization may flow upstream. The
demos may be transformed.
Finally, this article has shown that settler-rights cases may shape the course of Indi-
genous (de)colonization. They did so in Canada’s NWT. Broadly speaking, the court’s
refusal in 1983 to condemn the impugned plebiscite ordinance opened the way for
the creation of Nunavut, a landmark act of Indigenous decolonization. Conversely, set-
tlers’ success in 1999 effectively terminated hopes for territorial Indigenous control or
power sharing; thereafter, Indigenous self-determination was pursued more narrowly.
The NWT demos was, to a greater degree, colonized by settlers. Ongoing settler
legal action has sought, so far unsuccessfully, to extend and entrench this demotic
advantage. How further rights-claims will shape the course of settler-colonialism in
the NWT remains to be seen.
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